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INTRODUCTION
I wish the rent
2
was heaven sent.
As the nation continues to experience unprecedented economic
growth,3 the unemployment rate sits at the lowest level in thirty years,4
and the stock market remains at a record level,' 750,000 people are
homeless6 each night.7 At any given time, at least 230,000 people use
shelters and soup kitchens.' Low-wage income earners are increas-
I By "anti-homeless," I mean those laws that adversely affect homeless persons at a rate dis-
proliortionate to their numbers vis-a-vis the unaffected population.
BA., 1998, George Washington University; J.D. Candidate, 2001, University of Pennsylva-
nia. First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Louis Rulli, not only for his help with
this Comment, but also for his guidance and support during my entire law school career. I also
would like to thank Paul Messing, Esq. for being so generous with insight and suggestions with
early versions of this Comment. In addition, I would like to thankJean Sbarge, Esq. for her in-
exhaustible willingness to edit drafts of this Comment as well as for her patience. Finally, I
would like to thank Katie Worthman and the other members of the Journal of Constitutional Law
for their work on this Comment.
2 LANGSTON HUGHES, Little Lyric (Of Great Importance), in SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON
HUGHES 127 (1987).
3 See Gene Epstein, Memo to Alan Greenspan: Take This Man to Lunch and Listen, BARRON'S,
Jan. 17, 2000 at 27 (discussing the role of the Bureau of Economic Analysis in keeping track of
the rowing economy).
Jeannine Aversa,Jobless Rate is Lowest Since '70, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 5, 2000, at Al.
6 Miriam Hill, A Return to the 'Old'Lifts Dow to Record, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 17, 2000, at Al.
£ Various definitions for the term "homeless" have been put forward. See Maria Foscarinis,
Downward Spiral- Homelessness and its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 5 (1996) (defin-
ing homeless as "those persons who lack a fixed and regular address."). For the purposes of this
Comment, the simple dictionary definition of homeless, those "having no home or permanent
residence," suffices. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1083 (1993).
National Alliance to End Homelessness, Facts About Homelessness, at http://v.endhome
lessness.org/back/factsus.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2000). The nation's homeless population is
"impossible to measure with 100% accuracy" because of the transient nature of homelessness.
National Coalition for the Homeless, How Many People Experience Homelessness?, at http://nch.ari.
net/numbers.html (Feb. 1999).
8 The Urban Institute, Homelessness: Ten Basic Questions Answered, at http://www.urban.org/
news/factsheets/homelessFS.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2000). Due to a lack of resources, cities
540
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ingly "being priced out of the housing market as rents rise."" For
every one hundred households at or below thirty percent of the aver-
age household's median income, there were only thirty-sLx units both
affordable and available for rent.10
In the City of Brotherly Love, Philadelphia, this scenario is no dif-
ferent. While the city's economy" and reputation'2 continue to im-
prove, the impoverished of the city remain in dire straits. Approxi-
mately 351,000 Philadelphians, a number larger than the total
population of Pittsburgh, live under the federal poverty level." On
any single night in October 1999, more than 350 people slept on the
city's streets between midnight and 4 a.m., and "[t]hat doesn't in-
clude all areas of the city or abandoned buildings."" This situation
has created tension between businesses and the homeless in the
could not meet twent)-six percent of requests for emergency shelter in 199S. National Coli-
dion for the Homeless, How Many People Experience Hondlessnzes?, at http:/ nch.,ui.net 'nutbers.
html (Feb. 1999).
q Press Release, New HUD Report Shows Grouing Shortage of Affordable Housing. HUD
No. 99-198 (Sept. 23, 1999) (quoting HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo) (internal quotations
omitted).
'o lId
1 Taxes are down. SeeAndrew Cassel, Looking Behind the City's Facade, PuIL . IQt'IREE. Feb.
10, 1999 at C1. Tourism is up. SceJane M. Von Bergen. Come 2000, Crater Cty East is Counting
on aRenaissance, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 20, 1998. at DI. In addition, a hotel boom occurred in
anticipation of the 2000 Republican National Convention taking place in Philadelphia in tie
summer of 2000, Earni Young, Philaddphia Hotel BusirCss Booms With RepubliCan CoXVention,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 4, 2000, and the vacancy rate for "quality" office space rests at its lo'est
level in fifteen years--a figure half that of the rate in 1993. Bob Fernandez. Dawntaren Marptfor
Office Space is Red-Hot PHIL. INQUIRERJuly 21, 2000, at Al.
'0 Vice President Al Gore called the city's last mayor, Ed Rendell, Amnerica's maser." Ger-
ald Shields, Advicefor a Mayor: Accent the Negative. B.LT. SUN, May 30, 1999. at IC. &e also Here's
thePhilad ephia Story, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTF. May 23, 1999, at El ('There has been a slight
job gain recently under [Mayor] Rendell. His dream of turning a stretch of South Broad Street
into an entertainment complex called the Avenue of dte Arts is beginning to look like it might
work. Hotel chains can't seem to build enough rooms fast enough to accommodate the Penn-
sylvania Convention Center.") [hereinafter Philaddphia Star]. Moreover, the overtly democratic
city recently attracted the 2000 Republican National Convention. emen though Philadelphia has
not had a Republican mayor since 1948. See id.
Is Philadelphia StoM, supra note 12. The federal government defines the poverty level for a
fimily of four as an annual income of $16,050. A Few Facts About Hungrr; at http:!/www.libert
neLorg/gpfb/facts.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2000).
14 Solomon E. Jones, Baby Step: A Bump in Philly's Homlessness Budget ul.ay Bear Fruit, PHtILL
WEEKLY, December 29, 1999. It should be noted that this article also asserted that it appeared
that Philadelphia's homeless population was dropping. Id. The size of tie population, how-
ever, does not affect this assertion that the homeless are experiencing an especially hostile cnvi-
ronment. In 1996, the city closed shelters to single adults, 'except in special cases.' at a time
when the city needed, at a minimum, two hundred more beds to shelter those needing refuge.
Dave Davies, City Closing Shelters to Single Adults: iants to Help More Families PIIL%. D YIL NEIS,
July 17, 1996, at 6. Seventy-eight percent of households receiving emergency food hae an an-
nual household income of less than $10,000. A Few Farts About Hunger, at http: / ww.libcrt)
net.org/gpfb/facts.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2000). A 1993 resolution of the Philadelphia Bar
Association understates the point "the homeless population in Philadelphia is in dire need of
assistance." Philadelphia Bar Resolutions: 199, Authorizing Pro Bono Legal Resources .Veld to Es-
tablish a Program to Collect Interest on Real Estate Trust Accounts (July. 1993).
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downtown area of Philadelphia, known as Center City.'5 While busi-
nesses have attempted to take advantage of the regional and national
economic booms, 6 the homeless still struggle to survive. As a part of
this struggle, homeless persons must go to the area where people are
likely to be and likely to have money: the business and tourist dis-
tricts. At the same time, businesses believe that business is best if
homeless persons and their possessions remain far from their store-
fronts.'
7
In January 1999, Philadelphia joined forty-nine other cities in
passing ordinances that restrict the activities and the mere presence
of homeless persons in the downtown area. 8 The Philadelphia
"Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance" 19 prohibits many activities in which
segments of the homeless population often engage:' ° panhandling
within eight feet of a building entrance or vending truck or within
twenty feet of a bank entrance or an automated-teller machine,2' lying
on the public sidewalk (except in a medical emergency), sitting on
the sidewalk for more than thirty minutes in a two-hour period," and,
in certain instances, aggressive panhandling. 3 Arguing that the bill
was anti-homeless, one city councilwoman who voted against the or-
dinance called it "the most negative and anti-American bill I've ever
seen."
24
15 The most well-known tourist sights are found in this area, and this is the center of the re-
tail and restaurant boom that the city has experienced recently. See R.W. Apple, The Philadelphia
Story, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 30, 2000, at C1 ("[NJow the city is a playground for foodies,
with heroically hip restaurants opening every month. These are no storefront improvisations;
by the end of the year, Neil Stein, who started it all with a place called Striped Bass, will have
opened five sophisticated spots at a cost of $10 million."). Center City "runs two miles from the
Delaware River west to the Schuylkill [River] and one mile from South Street north to Vine
Street." Tom Ferrick,Jr., Philadelphia History, PHILA. INQUIRER MAC., May 21, 2000, at 7.
16 SeeApple, supra note 15 (noting that new restaurants and hotels are opening in buildings
that previously housed failed businesses). The city recently broke ground for a new visitors ce n-
ter. Larry Fish, Lofty Ambitions, Divergent Goals for Visitor Center, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 6, 1998, at
B1.
17 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (discussing a city's
difficulty in maintaining aesthetically pleasing streets in light of a growing homeless popula-
tion).
18 National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, Homeless Find There is No Room at the
Inn-But Plenty inJai at http://www.nlchp.org/outofsight.html (Jan. 1999).
19 PHILA., PA., CODE § 10-611 (1998).
20 In early 1999, it took a lawsuit by Project H.O.M.E. and the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion (ACLU), for the city to agree to end "frivolous arrests of homeless persons" for "obstructing
the highway." William O'Brien, Organize! Philadelphia Campaign Reshapes Homelessness Debate,
SHELTERFORCE ONLINE, at http://vw.nhi.org/online/issues/106/organize.html (July/Aug.
1999).
21 PHILA., PA., CODE § 10-611(4)(b).
22 Id. at (2) (h).
23 Id. at (4) (a).
24 Richard G. Barnes, Council Approves Sidewalk Behavior Bill With 12-4 Vote, PHILA. TRIB.,June
19, 1998, at 1A. There is a dispute as to whether the Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance is in fact
anti-homeless. The ordinance requires that police officers attempt to help any person in viola-
tion of the ordinance believed to need social or medical services. PHILA., PA., CODE § 10-
611 (7)(a)(.2) (1998). Then City Council President-now Mayor-John Street argued that this
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This article outlines a possible constitutional attack on the Phila-
delphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance, = as a model for attacking simi-
lar ordinances, under the Fourteenth Amendment. " Although there
already exists a broad range of cases and scholarship on laws ad-
versely affecting the homeless, "t there has been neither a thorough
attempt to assess any such law under the Fourteenth Amendment nor
an assessment of the constitutionality of the Philadelphia ordinance.
In fact, when dealing with such laws, courts often do not address cer-
ordinance actually benefits the homeless. See Cynthia Burton, Strvt'% SidewaL.B:hamar Bill Bnngs
FireFrom Colleagues, PHILA. INQUIRERJune 4, 1998, at BI. This argument fIils to incorporate
two facts: one, a law may be unconstitutional even if perceived to benefit an allegedly disadvan-
taged group; and, two, the city can provide these services %ithout enforcing the allegedly un-
constitutional parts of the ordinance (these services could be provided in a different bill).
PHILA., PA., CODE§ 10-611 (1998).
SU.S. CONSr. amend. XIV.
27 Similar ordinances have been scrutinized under die First and Eighth amendments. In
Clark v. Communi, for Creative Non-Violence 468 U.S. 288 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that
the government may ban sleeping in public parks even though the act of sleeping in a park to
draw attention to the homeless situation may constitute political speech under the First
Amendment. If, on the other hand, a homeless individual has no place to sleep. punishing the
individual for being homeless may be cruel and unusual punishtnent. See, e.g., Rob Teir. Restor-
ing Order in Urban Public Spaces, 2 TaX. REV. L. & POL 255, 266 (1998) ('[Punishing the act of
sleeping in public, by someone who truly has no other doice, could punish the combination of
both being and not having the shelter." (emphasis in original)). Although arguments alleging
that anti-homeless laws violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against penalizing a person
for their status have seen some success at the trial court level, see, eg., Pottinger v. City of Miami.
810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561-65 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (extending the protections of the Eighth Amend-
ment to limit the criminal prohibition of "innocent conduct" derivative of a certified class'
status as homeless), most courts have rejected this argument. S, e.g.,Jonce v. City and Count),
of San Francisco 846 F. Supp. 843,849 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (rejecting Eighth Amnendment attack);
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995) (holding that no Eighth Amendment vio-
lation existed for enforcement of camping ordinance). Ordinances such as the Sidewalk Bchav-
ior Ordinance seem more susceptible to First Amendment arguments, however. See Amster v.
City of Tempe, 99-72-PHX-SMMl (D. Ariz. Jan 26, 2000) (unpublished), at http://ww.public.
asu.edu/--aldous/permanenthtml (holding that a Tempe, Arizona. ordinance forbidding sit-
ting on the city's sidewalks during certain hours of the day violates the First Amendment). See
also Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F. Supp. 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
begging constitutes "communicative activity of some sort" and that a New York Penal Law that
rendered a person guilty of loitering when he remained in a public place in order to beg vio-
lated the First Amendment); Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184 (Mass. 1997) (hold-
ing that statute prohibiting public begging without a license violated the First Amendment).
But see, Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that neither the Califor-
nia nor the United States constitutions invalidated a statute making aggressive begging or solic-
iting a misdemeanor). It seems dear that certain parts of the ordinance, see, e.g.. 10-
611(4) (a),(b), would be subject to more stringent analysis due to their restriction on speech in
a public forum. See Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F. Supp. 699, 703-04 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that the sidewalks of New York City are a -category of public property tradition-
ally held open to the public for expressive activity" on which the regulation of speech is sub-
jected to "the highest scrutiny"). See also Ledford v. State, 652 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that city ordinance prohibiting begging for money upon public way was uncon-
stitutional as overbroad and vague since the ordinance restricted speech on traditional public
forum and was more intrusive than necessary). This article focuses on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because of the perception that the Fourteenth Amendment champions the rights of the
politically and economically powerless, and because this article is less concerned uith restric-
tions on speech in a public forum than on restrictions on strictly being in that public forum.
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tain Fourteenth Amendment protections,28 such as substantive due
process. This analysis begins, in Part I, with a discussion of the lit-
erature describing homelessness in the United States and a brief de-
scription of the homeless population in Philadelphia. Part II dis-
cusses the history of so-called "anti-homeless" laws. Part III presents
the Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance. Part IV discusses two
recent court decisions dealing with similar ordinances and compares
those ordinances to the Philadelphia ordinance. Part V analyzes the
ordinance under the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that while
it does not violate procedural due process rights or infringe upon a
fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the ordinance violates the personal liberty
guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and may unconstitutionally target the homeless popula-
tion. Part VI addresses the Philadelphia public interest community's
apparent decision not to challenge the ordinance. Lastly, the discus-
sion concludes by raising specific concerns about the failure to chal-
lenge the Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance.
I. WHO ARE THE HOMELESS?
We are the desperate
Who do not care,
The hungry
Who have nowhere
To eat,
No place to sleep,
The tearless
Who cannot
Weep.30
Homelessness results from a variety of societal and personal fac-
tors, as well as economic ones." The societal factors include a com-
bination of a lack of affordable housing," insufficient income to pay
28 See infra Part V.
Cf City of Seattle v. McConahy, 937 P.2d 1133, 1137-39 (Wash. App. 1997) (holding that
the city's sidewalk ordinance did not violate substantive due process under the state constitu-
tio.2 LANGSTON HUGHES, Vagabonds, in SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HufwES 91 (1987).
31 See Robert Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of Shelter for the Poor, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 80
(1987) ("Homelessness, of course, is nothing more than the most radical symptom of every-
thing else that has not worked, the most dire example of poverty caused by any number of
things-bad housing, bad education, bad industrial development and so on.").3 -
See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, The Closing Door: Economic Causes of Homelessness, in THE
RIGHTs OF THE HOMELESS 803, 805 (1992) ("Americans become homeless primarily because
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for basic expenses, and insufficient government and community serv-
ices to either remedy this situation or help the homeless remedy it on
their own.33 The personal problems may include, among others, men-
tal illness, alcoholism, and family difficulties."
In spite of the widely held belief that the homeless are jobless,
forty-four percent of homeless Americans work at least part time
Evidently, the economic boom of the nineties has left many people
behind. Stuck in the lowest of low-paying jobs, they cannot find even
low-rent housing.6 Moreover, " [ t] hey work, they try to save, but they
can never accumulate the hundreds of dollars they need for the first
month's rent and security deposit on even a modest apartment." As
a result, at least 425,000 people in this country must sleep in public
spaces,s and at least 700,000 have no place to go during the day ex-
cept public spaces. 9 In twenty-nine major cities, the homeless popu-
lation exceeds the number of shelter beds provided to them."
Although numerous organizations exist to help the homeless, it is
generally understood that these organizations lack enough resources
to do little more than treat the symptoms.4' Thus, these organizations
often can offer only emergency relief, such as shelters, soup kitchens,
or legal advice." According to a government report, sixty percent of
homeless persons living alone and seventy percent of homeless per-
sons living with families are able to leave shelters when they receive
"needed services," such as housing subsidies, health care, substance-
abuse treatment, education, and job training." Regardless, there is
theycan't afford to pay the rent.").
See National Alliance to End Homelessness, Facts About Hondesses, at http://%.w.end
homelessness.org/back/ factsus.html (last visited Sept. 4. 2000). These are not the sole factors;
rather, they "are the systemic or underl)ing factors which cause homelessness.' Id
See Teir, supra note 27, at 262-63 (noting that numerous studies show that nationally sixty-
five to eighty-five percent of all street people suffer from alcoholism, drug addiction, mental
illness, or some combination of the three). See also Foscarinis. supra note 6. at 8-12 (describing
the most frequent causes of homelessness). Although scholars disagree as to the precise cause,
it is safe to assume that, at a minimum, homelessness results from a mixture of societal, eco-
nomic, and personal problems.
35 " ary Otto, 44 Percent of Homeless People Have Jobs, HUD Reports, P1iL%. IN QL IRER, Dec. 21,
1999, atA21.
6 See id.
37 See a
Foscarinis, supra note 6, at 14.
39 Id
40 Laura Parker, Homeless Find the Strets Grouing Colde, USA TODAY, Dec. 3. 1998, at 15A (cit-
ing a report of the U.S. Conference of Mayors).
41 See ia
See Foscarinis, supra note 6, at 12 ("To date, the primary societal response to homelessness
has been emergency relief"). In Philadelphia, the Homeless Advocacy Project provides direct
legal services to homeless persons. See Homeless Advocacy Project, at http://ww.libertyneL
org/hap/ (describing the organization's mission to provide "free legal services through volun-
teers to homeless people, and to non-profit community groups developing affordable housing
and other services for the homeless.") (last visited Oct. 8,2000).
Associated Press, Report Says Assistance Wital in Ghing Homless a Vew Start, PIIL-. INQUIRER.
Dec. 9, 1999, at A37.
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inadequate funding for such services."
In Philadelphia, the streets see approximately 6,500 homeless per-
sons on any given day, ten percent of whom live entirely on the
streets.45 Over eighty percent of the "accounted for" homeless are Af-
rican-American, ten percent are white, and five percent are His-
panic.46 The two largest groups constitute single adult males between
the ages of twenty and forty and single women in their twenties and
thirties with small children. Even though homeless services have in-
creased in recent years, in many cases, "homeless people aren't al-
lowed into most programs without identification [and] in many cases,
homeless people lose their identification and don't have jobs with
which to earn money to pay the four-dollar fee for a birth certificate,
or the nine-dollar fee for a Pennsylvania non-driver's license."'
As this all suggests, the homeless and the rest of society are inex-
tricably linked. Society's economic and sociological shortcomings
help cause and perpetuate homelessness, while-as will be shown be-
low-homelessness is perceived as an obstacle to revival of the mod-
em downtown area of cities.
II. THE HISTORY OF ANTI-HOMELESS LAWS
49
There are words like Freedom
Sweet and wonderful to say.
On my heart-strings freedom sings
All day everyday.
There are words like Liberty
That almost make me cry.
If you had known what I knew
You would know why.50
Laws disproportionately affecting the homeless are not new. In
colonial times, vagrancy laws punished those displaying the character-
istics of homeless persons."' Throughout the nineteenth century and
4 Id.
45 Fact Sheet on Homelessness, Project H.O.M.E., (Jan. 13, 2000) (on file with author).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Jones, supra note 14.
4 "Anti-homeless" laws are also referred to as laws regulating "chronic street nuisance,"
Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and
Public-Space Zoning 105 YALE LJ. 1165, 1175 (1996), and "quality of life" laws, Mary I. Coombs,
The Constricted Meaning of "Community" in Community Policing 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1367, 1369
(1998).
50 LANGSTON HUGHES, Refugee in America, in SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUICIES 290
(1987).
Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to
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much of the twentieth century, vagrancy laws were used in conjunc-
tion with loitering laws and laws inhibiting the movement of poor
persons from one state to another. .° These laws went virtully unchal-
lenged in this country until the Supreme Court made attorneys avail-
able for the indigent in criminal proceedings." Although many anti-
loitering and vagrancy laws have since been declared unconstitu-
tional,5 the 1990's saw a sharp increase in the number of laws ad-
versely affecting homeless persons. 5  Professor Robert Ellickson con-
tends, convincingly, that at the end of the 1980s and during the past
decade what is popularly known as "compassion fatigue" hit the na-
tion.s This is the idea that people began to believe "the street person
is... overusing scarce public space... [and] has not sought out em-
ployment, family assistance, or public aid" -- in other words,
"enough's enough."8 This has also been referred to as "[w]eariness
with the homeless on the streets." 9 Another possible explanation,
and a much more straightfonvard one, is that this frustration
stemmed from the "skyrocketed" numbers of homeless persons at the
end of the early eighties, 64 which made the homeless more visible.
Regardless of its origin, homeless persons and others on the street
have suffered and continue to suffer a backlash from "the tide favor-
ing social inclusion" of the eighties.
6'
Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL L REv'. 631. 638 (1992). In Papachrutou z.
City ofJacksonvi/e, 405 US. 156 (1972), the United States Supreme Court struck down a vagrancy
ordinance based on due process grounds.
5. See Simon, supm note 51, at 639-44 (discussing vagrancy laws in the United States). See also
Mark Peters, Note, Homeessness: A Historical Perspedise on Modern Leislation, 88 Micl. L REv.
1209 (1990) (discussing the history of anti-homeless laws, focusing on New York City).
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) ("[In federal courts counsel must
be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intel-
ligently waived."). See generally City of Chicago v. Morales. 527 U.S. 41, 54 (1999) (noting that
vagrancy laws that were patterned on "Elizabethan poor laws stood unchallenged until the Su-
preme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright).
See, eg., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (striking down a California loitering
statute on due process grounds); Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville. 405 US. 156 (1972) (strik-
ing down a vagrancy ordinance on due process grounds); Edwvards v. California. 314 U.S. 160
(1941) (striking down a California law that prohibited bringing "paupers" into the state).
Cities cite several different reasons for passing this legislation. See Foscarinis, supra note 6.
at 23-24 ("Some cities associate homeless people with crime or equate them idth 'criminal ele-
ments,' others associate activities such as begging uith crime. Others express concern about
public health and sanitation problems associated with people living in public, or about the
health and safety of homeless people living on the streets. Cities also frequently cite concerns
that the presence of homeless people or beggars adversely affects businesses or tourism. An-
other type of purpose is 'preserving the appearance' of public areas and facilities. Some cities
simgly express concern about 'homeless people wandering around.'" (citations omitted)).
See Ellickson, supra note 49, at 1178 (quoting Ellen Goodman, Swarm- of Begar Cause
'CoMpassion Fatigue,' NEW HAVEN REG., Aug. 4, 1989, at A9).
5, 1d.
Parker, supra note 40.
6o Simon, supra note 51, at 646.
61 See Ellickson, supra note 49, at 1214. According to Ellickson, the attitude in the 1980's
toward homeless persons was the "culmination" of "a larger ideological shift" in wshich "the
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The National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty has deter-
mined that fifty of the country's largest cities have anti-homeless laws
or policies that result in "anti-homeless" measures taken pursuant to
those policies.62 Critics contend that, in effect, these cities are "crimi-
nalizing homelessness. 6 3 Among the measures used are laws or poli-
cies that prohibit: "the mere presence of homeless people in the
city;"64 sleeping in all or certain public places;65 sitting or lying on
sidewalks in certain areas;6 or begging (panhandling) in certain ar-
eas.67  The Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance8 fits neatly
within the latter two categories.
The passing of an ordinance such as the Sidewalk Behavior Ordi-
nance does not result in a clear demarcation of good versus evil. As
with many government restrictions, some "good" seemingly can be
found on either side of the argument. As one judge has written, liti-
gation to combat these laws:
In essence... results from an inevitable conflict between the need of the
homeless individuals to perform essential, life-sustaining acts in public
and the responsibility of the government to maintain orderly, aestheti-
cally pleasing public parks and streets. The issues raised in [these types
of cases] reveal various aspects of this conflict which, unfortunately, has
American zeitgeist strongly supported bringing previously marginalized groups into the social
mainstream." Id.
62 See National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, Homeless Find There is No Room at the
Inn-But Plenty inJai4 at http://www.nlchp.org/outofsight.html, (Jan. 1999). See also Big Cities
Cracking Down on Homeless, Group Says, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 12, 1996, at 23 (discussing the find-
ings of the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty).
SeeFoscarinis, supra note 6, at 16-17 ("The failure to address homelessness in an adequate
manner in the 1980s has made its criminalization possible in the 1990s.").
Id. at 17 (discussing DALLAS, TEx., CITYCODE § 31-13(a) (1) (1992)).
6, See, e.g., SANTA ANA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10-402 (1992):
Unlawful Camping. It shall be unlawful for any person to camp, occupy camp facilities
or use camp paraphernalia in the following areas, except as otherwise provided:
(a) Any street;
(b) Any public parking lot or public area, improved or unimproved.
Such ordinances are often referred to as "camping ordinances." Foscarinis, supra note 6, at 17.
See Complaint Seeking Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunctive Re-
lief, Amster v. City of Tempe, Civ. Action No. 99-0072 (D. Ariz. 1999), at http://www.public.asu.
edu/-aldous/complain.html (last visited on Nov. 15, 1999) (challenging City Code 29-70 for
Tempe, Arizona, which does not allow a person to "sit or lie down upon a public sidewalk
upon ... any.., object not permanently affixed upon a public sidewalk or median in the down-
town central commercial district during the hours between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on week-
days and between 7:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. on Fridays and Saturdays," except for enumerated
exceptions). The Philadelphia Ordinance, as seen in Part III, infra, contains a similar prohibi-
tion.
67 See, e.g., Greater Cincinnati Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cincinnati, 56 F.3d 710,
713 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE § 910-13(b), which says that "no
person shall ... [m]ake a request, solicitation or demand for money or other thing of value, in
a manner which would alarm, intimidate, threaten, menace, harass, or coerce a reasonable per-
son."). The Philadelphia Ordinance, as seen in Part III, infra, contains a similar anti-begging
measure. By 1994, twenty-six cities had passed anti-panhandling laws. Colman McCarthy, Lau,
vs. the Homeless, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1994, at A27.
68 See discussion infra Part III.
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[sic] become intensified due to the overwhelming increase in the num-
ber of homeless people in recent years and a corresponding decrease in
federal aid to cities.
Litigation challenging laws that disproportionately affect the
homeless has been rare and success has been limited."' In the mean-
time, the number of homeless persons in this country continues to
rise.7'
III. THE PHILADELPHIA SIDEWALK BEHAVIOR ORDINANCE
The Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance did not pass qui-
edy into law. According to one observer, then City Council Presi-
dent-now Mayor-John F. Street "took about as much flak as he has
ever taken" during the legislative process r J. Whyatt Mondeshire,
President of the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP, said that the bill
was a "spawn of 'fear and frustration,' as well as of Street's ambitions
to be mayor."73 Councilman Street defended the bill as an effort to
promote more civil behavior on the sidewalk, which would encourage
commerce and tourism, 4 and make the city a "better" place to live 7
Opponents of the bill said in rebuttal that "[t]his bill does so much to
hurt so many people," 6 and that it "treats homelessness as a crime-
not as a human condition."7 The Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance
finally came into effect on October 8, 1998,"8 while protesters carried
signs reading "The City of Brotherly WHAT?" and chanted "stop the
war on the poor."'
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
10 Pottinger is the only published decision that is an outright legal victory challenging die
constitutionality of an "anti-homeless" law. Sce Part IA, infra. See atw Amster v. City of Tempe,
99-72-PHX-SMM (D. Ariz.Jan 26,2000) (unpublished), at http://wwat.public.asu.edu!-aldous/
permanent.htnml (last visited Aug. 28, 2000) (holding that a Tempe, Arizona ordinance forbid-
ding sitting on the city's sidewalks during certain hours of the day violates the First Amend-
ment). It must be noted, however, that success may have been had without challenging the
statute in court, or local homeless advocates may have settled for close police monitoring or
found other ways of toning down the laws through negotiation with government official. See
Associated Press, 'Sidewalk-Behiavior'Law Rapped, HARRISBURG PATRIOT,Jan. 20, 1999. at B34.
71 Parker, supra note 40.
,2 Burton, supra note 24.13 ld"
74 See Rick Sarlat, City Council Becomes Battlkground Otr Sidtuwlh BA, PIILX. TRIB.. June 5,
1998, at 1A (arguing that "the economic, social, and cultural life of te city could not survive
without the ability of pedestrians to use the public sidewalk for safe and unobstructed pas-
sages.").
See Barnes,supra note 24, at 1A. ("[The bill] makes the city a more pleasant place for those
who live, work and visit Philadelphia.").
76 Sarlat, supra note 74.
,7 Burton, supra note 24 (quoting former head of the Philadelphia Housing Authority.John
F. WhiteJr.).
76 The bill passed by a twelve to four vote. See Barnes, supra note 24.
1
9Joan Loviglio, Advocates Fght Philaddphia Sidwalh Lau, PATRIOT LEDGER.Jan. 19. 1999, at
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The Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance proscribes a wide range of ac-
tivities on the sidewalk, some applying city-wide,0 and others only
within Center City,8' and the surrounding area.8' The homeless are
adversely affected by the following prohibitions of the ordinance:
lying on the public sidewalk, or on any object placed on the public side-
walk;
sitting on the public sidewalk, or on any object placed on the public
sidewalk for more than twenty minutes in a two-hour period;
4
placing or maintaining any bench, planter, fixture or other street furni-
ture on the public sidewalk without a permit;s
sitting, standing, lying or otherwise using the public sidewalk or placing
one's belongings or other objects upon the public sidewalk, in such a
manner as to unreasonably and significantly impede or obstruct the free
passage of pedestrians;
8
6
allowing his or her belongings or other objects to remain unattended on
87the sidewalk for more than fifteen minutes;
soliciting money for any purpose within eight feet of a building entrance,
or vending cart, or within twenty feet of a bank entrance or automatic
teller machine;
soliciting money for any purpose on the public sidewalk in an aggressive
manner, or accompanied by conduct such as repeated begging, insistent
panhandling, retaliatory comments, blockage of free passage, and con-
frontations which are "likely to cause a reasonable person to fear bodily
harm to oneself or another, or damage to or loss of property." "
Regarding the first six violations listed above, the ordinance pro-
vides that a police officer may not issue a violation or take any coer-
80 The provisions that apply citywide include those related to parking a motorized vehicle,
gambling, selling unlicensed goods or services, "unreasonable obstructions," littering, creating
excessive noise, and not keeping the sidewalk on one's private property clear of litter or ob-
structions and in good repair. See PHILA., PA., CODE § 10-611 (1) (a) (1998).
81 The area known as Center City in Philadelphia "runs two miles from the Delaware River
west to the Schuylkill [River] and one mile from South Street north to Vine Street." Ferrick,
supra note 15, at 7.
2 Those sidewalk activities proscribed within the specified zone include riding a bicycle,
scooter, roller skates, or skateboard; unloading or loading a vehicle where safety does not ne-
cessitate obstructing the sidewalk; lying on the sidewalk or placing any object on the sidewalk,
sitting on the public sidewalk or on any object on the sidewalk for more than one hour in any
two-hour time period; placing or maintaining a bench without a license; leaving any belongings
unattended; allowing dogs, guard cats, or pigs to go without a leash; allowing snakes outside of
a cage; and not muzzling any animal with a "vicious propensity." PHiLA., PA., CODE § 10-
611(1)(a) § 10-611(1)(b) (1998).
84 Id. at (2) (g).
Id. at (2) (h).
85 Id. at (2)(k).
86 Id. at (2)(1).
87 Id. at (2) (m).
88 Id. at (4) (b).
89 Id. at (4) (c).
90 Id. at (4) (a).
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cive action against an individual without first issuing a verbal xwu-ning,
and, to those who refuse to comply, a written warning." The officer
also must determine if the person allegedly in violation of the provi-
sion needs medical assistance or social service assistance, such as
mental health or drug treatment.9 If so, he or she must contact an
"Outreach Team" 3 to deal with the individual and offer assistance."
The ordinance does not address, however, what would happen if the
person refuses the help of the Outreach Team. Violations of num-
bers six and seven of the prohibitions listed are subject to a fine of no
more than one hundred dollars."' Violations of prohibitions one
through five are subject to a twenty-dollar fine. ' The ordinance does
not provide for prison terms.97
Homeless advocates consider the final version of the ordinance a
compromise with the city.98 Many agree that the number of homeless
persons on downtown streets has dropped by twenty-five percent or
more since the implementation of the ordinance and the new serv-
ices for the homeless that came with it.99  Nonetheless, the much
touted "benefit," that the ordinance would bring increased services to
homeless persons, seems not to be materializing.'O°
IV. OUTCOMES OF LITIGATION CHALLENGING ORDINANCES SIMILAR
TO THE PHILADELPHIA SIDEWALK BEHAVIOR ORDINANCE
Although no court has analyzed the Philadelphia ordinance,
courts have analyzed other similar "sidewalk ordinances." A look at
the outcomes of those cases will help assess the Philadelphia ordi-
nance.
91 Id. at (7)(a)(.1).
92 Id. at (7) (a) (.2).
9 Id. at (7) (d). An Outreach Team is "a group of mental health or drug and alcohol coun-
selors authorized and designated by the Department of Public Health .... Id.
94 Id. at (7) (a) (.2).
Id. at (8) (b).
Id. at (8) (a).
97 The absence of possible prison confinement for violators of the ordinance does not con-
tradict the argument that the ordinance criminalizes being homeless: subjecting homeless per-
sons to penalties, such as a fine, constitutes a form of criminalization. St§ 10-611 (8) (imposing
penalties for violations of the ordinance).
98 Interview with Paul Messing. Esq., of Kairys. Rudovsky. Messing. Epstein. and Rau, in
Philadelphia, Pa. (June 10, 2000).
99 See Editorial, Fewer Homeless, PHLA. INQUIRERJune 15. 1999, at A18 ('[Hloneless advo-
cates and the Center City District agree the number of homeless on dowmtown streets has
droaped by twenty-five percent.").
See LauraJ. Bruch, The Other Side of a Law: Homes for the Homdes, PiitL. INQIRER. Feb.
17, 1999, at B1. Because the city did not directly link the Sideir.alk Behavior Ordinance's im-
plementation of the new social services with programs designed to help the homless, these
programs in and of themselves fail to make the ordinance a "prohomeless" law. Instead. the
new programs take some of the sting out of the ordinance.
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A. Pottinger v. City of Miami'o
In December of 1988, a class of over six thousand homeless per-
sons filed an action in federal court under section 1983 of the United
States Code 0 2 against the city of Miami, Florida, alleging that the city
had "a custom, practice and policy of arresting, harassing and other-
wise interfering with homeless people for engaging in basic activities
of daily life-including sleeping and eating-in the public places
where they are forced to live."'" The plaintiff class further alleged
that "the City ha[d] arrested thousands of homeless people for such
life-sustaining conduct under various City of Miami ordinances and
Florida Statutes,"' 4 and that the City "routinely [seized and de-
stroyed] their property."'' The plaintiffs did not challenge the facial
validity of the various ordinances and statutes; rather, they asked for
an injunction against the City, preventing it "from arresting homeless
individuals for inoffensive conduct, such as sleeping or bathing, that
they are forced to perform in public."'0 6 The laws at issue were:
Sec. 37-53.1 prohibiting "any number of persons to so stand, loiter or
walk upon any street or sidewalk in the city so as to obstruct free passage
over, on or along said street or sidewalk after a request by a law enforce-
ment officer to move on so as to cease blocking or obstructing free pas-
sage thereon;"
0 7
Section 37-63 stating "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to sleep on
any of the streets, sidewalks, public places, or upon the private property
of another without the consent of the owner thereof;"
0 8
Section 37-34 prohibiting "any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a
time or in a manner not usual for law abiding individuals, under circum-
stances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm for the safety of
persons or property in the vicinity. " 1 9 Such alarm must result from "spe-
cific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant a finding that a breach of the peace
101 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
102 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1996) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State, or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
Id. A city is deemed a "person" for purposes of § 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
103 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1554.
10I4 d.
10, Id.
106 Id.
107 MlAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-63 (1990).
100 Id.
109 Id. at § 37-34(D). See also Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1560 n.13.
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is imminent or the safety of persons or property is threatened;"""
Section 38-3 providing "that public parks shall be closed to the general
public from 10:00 p.m. to 7:00 
am.;"
Section 37-35 prohibiting loitering, and
Sections 810.08-09 which the Pottinger court interpreted as prohibiting
sleeping, sitting or standing in public buildings, as trespass.11
The court granted the injunction, citing five reasons in support of
its decision. First, the court found that the City knew or should have
known of the alleged arrests and violations of the plaintiffs' rights
and took no steps to stop such conduct; therefore, there existed a
pattern and practice intended to drive the homeless out of the city."'
Next, the court stated that arrests violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because police
made the arrests as punishment for activities that the homeless had to
perform in public.' The court also ruled that the City had violated
homeless persons' procedural due process rights because the ordi-
nances were overbroad, reaching innocent and inoffensive conduct.' 6
The fourth finding concluded that the City had continuously violated
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures of property.' The final reason given by the court was
that "the City's practice of arresting homeless individuals for per-
forming essential, life-sustaining acts in public when they have abso-
lutely no place to go effectively infringes on their fundamental right
to travel in violation of the Equal Protection [C]lause.""8 The court's
analysis demonstrates the breadth of protection that the Fourteenth
Amendment can offer the homeless."9
110 See also Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1560 n.13.
I Id. at 1560 n.12 (summarizing IAMI, FLA., CODE § 38-3 (1990)).
112 Mti., FLA., CODE § 37-35 (1990). See also Pottinger 810 F. Supp. at 1560 n.14.
"' FL. STAT. § 810.08-.09. See also Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1560.
114 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1561 (holding that the city's failure to prevent improper po-
lice conduct even though the city had knowledge of the conduct is actionable under § 1983).
1 Id at 1554.
116 1&
117 Id
118 Id.
9 The parties settled in December, 1997. Miami agreed to implement a uaining program to
sensitize city police officers to the plight and legal rights of the homeless. Also, the city agreed
to provide guidelines to its officers in handling encounters. If an officer observes a person vio-
lating a city law by engaging in "life sustaining conduct.' she must first inform the homeless
person of available shelter and offer transportation to the shelter before arrest. National Law
Center on Homelessness and Poverty, CQvil Rights Lpdate, at http://-v.nlchp.org/legal.htrn
(last visited Jan. 10, 2000). Further, the settlement prohibits the destruction of homeless per-
sons' property, requires detailed records of encounters with homeless persons, and creates a
compensation fund to those who brought suit. Id.
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B. Roulette v. City of Seattle 2 0
On October 4, 1993, the Seattle, Washington, City Council en-
acted the following ordinance, known as the Seattle Sitting Ordi-
121nance:
No person, after having been notified by a law enforcement officer that
he or she is in violation of the prohibition in this section, shall sit or lie
down upon a public sidewalk, upon a blanket, chair, stool, or any other
object placed upon a public sidewalk, during hours between seven a.m.
and nine p.m. in the following zones:
1. The Downtown Zone,...
2. Neighborhood Commercial Zones .... 2
A person found in violation exposes himself to a fifty-dollar fine or com-
munity service.123
At the district court level, the plaintiffs' challenged the ordi-
nance as well as an ordinance that prohibited "aggressive begging. 's12
Plaintiffs claimed that the Sitting Ordinance violated numerous con-
stitutional protections: procedural due process protections against
vague laws that give law enforcement officers too much discretion 21
and laws that do not give proper notice to possible violators,' sub-
stantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,25 the right to travel,'29 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1s°
120 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
121 SEATrLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 15.48.
1 Roulette, 850 F. Supp.at 44 (quoting SEATrLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 15.48.040).
123 SEATrLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 15.48.050.
124 The plaintiffs consisted of a group of homeless persons, people who provided services to
and advocated for the homeless, a registrar of voters, a street musician, and various political,
social, and community organizations. See Roulette, 850 F. Supp at 1444.
125 SEA-IrLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015(A)(1). The court ruled that this ordinance
did not violate the First Amendment, as long as it was interpreted to apply to only "those threats
which would make a reasonable person fearful of harm to his or her person or property." Rou-
lette, 850 F. Supp. at 1453.
126 The plaintiffs argued that since "lawful activity" did not violate the Sitting Ordinance until
the police decided to give notice of a violation, the Sitting Ordinance failed to establish the
necessary minimum guidelines for law enforcement personnel required by Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1965). Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1445.
127 Id. at 1446.
128 The plaintiffs argued that substantive due process protected sitting on a sidewalk and thatsuch innocent activity cannot be rationally related to any sort of legitimate government interest.
Id. at 1447.
129 The plaintiffs alleged that the Sitting Ordinance impeded their ability to travel to and re-
main in the specified areas of the city and that the city's reasons for such impositions were not
sufficiently compelling enough to survive strict scrutiny under the Constitution. Id.The plaintiffs alleged two equal protection violations: first, they argued that the Sitting
Ordinance unconstitutionally restricted their fundamental rights to free speech, due process,
and travel; second, they argued that, in passing the ordinance, the city unconstitutionally tar-
geted and discriminated against the homeless. Id.
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The district court, in granting the City's motion for summary
judgment, declared the law constitutional on its face."' As to the
procedural due process challenge, the court rejected the vagueness
argument, stating that the ordinance "very clearly describes the pro-
scribed behavior... [and] does not leave police officers ith unfet-
tered discretion."3 2 It also rejected the argument that the ordinance
did not give adequate notice to citizens. The court emphasized that
under the ordinance no citation would be issued unless an officer
first warned the potential violator.'"
The plaintiffs' substantive due process arguments were also un-
successful. They argued that the prohibition against sitting on the
sidewalk, an innocent activitY, bears no rational relation to a legiti-
mate government interest. The court, seemingly accepting the
plaintiffs' claim that sitting constitutes a substantive due process lib-
erty interest, however, found the government's stated purposes-en-
suring pedestrian safety and safeguarding the economic vitality of
commercial area-legitimate and the sidewalk prohibitions rationally
related to that end.' -
In addition, the court found no violation of the right to travel.
The court distinguished Pottinger v. City of Mian l ' on three grounds:
the city of Seattle, unlike the city of Miami, did not enact the ordi-
nance "to expel homeless individuals from its commercial areas;"'
the ordinance "leaves open numerous options of places to sit or lie
down [and] does not impair individuals' ability to come into com-
mercial areas to take advantage of needed services;"'33 and the ordi-
nance only prohibits lying down or sitting from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m.'
Moreover, the court rejected the equal protection challenge, not-
ing that "the sidewalk ordinance neither infringes on a constitution-
ally protected right [i.e., the night to travel] nor discriminates against
a suspect or protected class."' Thus, because Seattle had a rational
basis for distinguishing between sidewalk sitters and other users of
the sidewalk, the court upheld the law.'
4'
13Id. at 1454.
13 Id. at 1446.
1ss Id. at 1446-47.
13 1&. at 1447.
15 Id.
1 810 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Fla. 1992). Se supra Part IVA.
I RouLete, 850 F. Supp. at 1448.
1ss Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1450.
141 Id. The court also denied plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to the ordinance be-
cause:
the act of sitting or lying is not necessarily related or inextricably linked to the speech or
expressive conduct. The homeless can still beg, the voter registrar can still register votes.
and the political and other community groups can still solicit support uithout sitting or
lying down as a necessary part of their communicative endeavors.
Id. at 1449.
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On appeal, plaintiffs narrowed the basis of their challenge to First
Amendment grounds and substantive due process grounds.4 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected both claims. 43 The
court engaged in a cursory substantive due process analysis-consist-
ing of a mere two paragraphs-concluding that "the record make [s]
clear that the statute at issue would be constitutional as applied in a
large fraction of cases;"' therefore, the plaintiffs' facial challenge
failed.
45
C. The Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance
in Light ofPottinger and Roulette
Although the Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance resem-
bles both the ordinances at issue in Pottinger and the sitting ordinance
at issue in Roulette, various factors distinguish the Philadelphia Ordi-
nance from its Miami and Seattle counterparts. Unlike the ordi-
nances and policies challenged in Pottinger, the Philadelphia ordi-
nance does not seem to be the result of a blatant systematic effort to
expel the homeless from the city.'46 After all, Philadelphia increased
funding for social services for the homeless within the city at the same
time it passed the ordinance.47 Moreover, the Pottinger court focused
on the fact that the ordinances applied city-wide. The Philadelphia
ordinance applies to only specified areas; thus, the ordinance allows
the restricted activities to occur within the city's borders.4 8 Further-
more, unlike the Philadelphia ordinance, the Miami ordinances did
not require that law enforcement officers first issue a warning to a
suspected offender. 49 Nevertheless, the Philadelphia ordinance, like
the ordinances at issue in Pottinger, reaches inoffensive activity such as
prolonged sitting on a public bench or lying on a sidewalk without
interfering with foot traffic) 5° Moreover, even though the Philadel-
phia ordinance does not apply city-wide, it does apply in the areas
142 Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying rehearing en banc).
14S Id. Judge Pregerson dissented on First Amendment grounds. See id. at 306 (stating that
the ordinance "aims at expressive conduct...."). Additionally, Judges Pregerson and Tashima
joined Judge Norris' dissent regarding the denial of rehearing en banc, based on First Amend-
ment concerns. See id at 311 (accusing the majority of "departing from the standard that con-
duct needs only 'a significant expressive element' to merit First Amendment protection." (cita-
tion omitted)).
'44 Id. at 306. The Seattle Sitting Ordinance was also challenged at the state level, surviving
there as well. See City of Seattle v. McConahy, 937 P.2d 1133, 1136-37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that the Sitting Ordinance did not violate the Washington State Constitution or the
First Amendment right to freedom of expression).
145 Roulette, 97 F.3d at 306.
146 See supra Part IV.A. Of course, it is impossible to know the underlying motivations of the
members of City Council.
'47 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
149 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
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with the heaviest foot traffic, the only places where life-sustaining ac-
tivities, such as begging, are feasible.
Likewise, the ordinance at issue in Roulette differs from the Side-
walk Behavior Ordinance in three key areas. First, the Seattle ordi-
nance applied only from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m."" The district court stressed
this aspect of the ordinance in determining that it did not violate ei-
ther the Equal Protection Clause or substantive due process protec-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 A second crucial difference is
that the Seattle ordinance does not restrict begging in the specified
zones. Thus, unlike the Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance,
the Seattle ordinance allows certain life-sustaining activities in the
specified zone. The final key difference betveen the ordinances is
that the Philadelphia ordinance attempts to alleviate some of the pos-
sible harm the law may cause to homeless individuals--therefore dis-
playing some degree of compassion.' s The Seattle ordinance does
not do so. The primary similarity between the two ordinances is that
both require that law enforcement officers warn a suspected violator
before issuing a citation.
In the end, because the Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance is less ab-
horrent than those ordinances and policies at issue in Pottinger," and
more restrictive than those at issue in Roulette,"" these decisions
should not serve as persuasive authority when a court assesses a chal-
lenge to the ordinance.'
Moreover, the differences between the Seattle and Philadelphia
ordinances are sufficiently distinguishable to ensure that even if Rou-
lette is persuasive, it would not preclude a court from striking down
the Philadelphia law. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in both Pottinger
and Roulette did not pursue certain legal arguments to which the
Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance appears vulnerable.
These arguments will now be examined.
V. CHALLENGING THE SIDEWALK ORDINANCE: ASSESSING
THE CONSTITUTIONALrIY OF THE PHILADELPHL
SIDEWALK BEHAVIOR ORDINANCE
Challenges to anti-homeless laws similar to the Philadelphia Side-
walk Behavior Ordinance have been virtually non-existent. In fact,
151 SEATLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 15.48.040.
152 Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1448.
153 This evidence of compassion, however, does not negate the discriminaton intent ncces-
sar7 for an equal protection challenge to the ordinance. Se infm Part V.B.See supra Part IV.A.
1 See supra Part IV.B.
156 Because the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has yet to review such a challenge or a
similar challenge, no binding precedents exist.
155 This is as opposed to camping ordinances, sw grnerally Teir, supra note 27, at 269, and loi-
tering and vagrancy laws, see supra Part II.
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Pottinger and Roullette are the only published opinions that deal with
such challenges. 15  Thus far the public interest community in Phila-
delphia has not challenged the ordinance in court.'59 As the follow-
ing shows, however, if challenged, there exist persuasive legal argu-
ments that the Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance violates the rights of
homeless persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Procedural Due Process
A law violates procedural due process guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment '6 when it meets the criteria of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine or, possibly, is overbroad.
1. Void-for-Vagueness
In Kolender v. Lawson,'6' the Supreme Court invalidated a statute
forbidding loitering because it violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendment. 62 The Court declared that in order for a penal statute
to withstand a void-for-vagueness attack the statute must "define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. "'O The
Court also stated that "[a]lthough the doctrine focuses both on ac-
tual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, .... the more im-
portant aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the
other principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a leg-
islature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement."'"
In Roulette v. City of Seattle,'65 the district court ruled that the side-
walk ordinance did not violate guideline requirements of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" The court declared
that the notification requirement in the Seattle ordinance "operates
to restrict police discretion rather than increasing police discretion to
15 But see Amster v. City of Tempe, 99-72-PHX-SMM (Apr. 30, 1999 D. Az.) (unpublished),
available at http://wvw.public.asu.edu/-aldous/decision.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2000) (hold-
ing that a Tempe, Arizona, ordinance forbidding sitting on the city's sidewalks during certain
hours of the day violates the First Amendment).
9 See discussion infra Part VI regarding this decision.
160 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life,liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1.
161 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
162 Id.
1 Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
16 Id. at 357-58 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
1 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994). See also supra Part W.B.
16 Id. at 1447 ("Certainly the ordinance does not address every conceivable question con-cerning the applicability and enforcement of the ordinance which could arise. But if this were
the standard, few laws, if any, would pass constitutional muster.").
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define the prohibited conduct."'' Because the Philadelphia ordi-
nance includes a similar notification requirement,'" this analysis
seemingly holds for it as well. On the other hand, the Philadelphia
ordinance gives law enforcement officers carte blanche in determinin
whether a person in violation needs medical or other 
assistance.
This discretion raises concerns that an officer may issue citations as a
default, especially considering the time it would require to contact an
Outreach Team, as required by the law."a Still, a court would likely
not declare the ordinance unconstitutionally vague due to a lack of
minimal guidelines for law enforcement since the ordinance requires
the officer to warn the suspect prior to issuing him a citation. The
ordinance ensures that, in the end, the homeless person controls
whether or not he incurs any type of penalty."'
2. Overbreadth
The Supreme Court seems unclear as to whether all types of laws,
or only laws that infringe on rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment, can be void because they are overbroad. At one point,
the Court declared that a "clear and precise enactment may neverthe-
less be 'overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally pro-
tected conduct."' If this statement accurately reflects the law, the
ordinance seems susceptible to a challenge as overbroad. In Grayned
v. City of Rockford,173 Justice Marshall stated that the "crucial ques-
tion ... is whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what
may not be punished under the First or Fourteenth Amendments. " "
The Pottinger court adopted this statement and declared the Miami
ordinances overbroad." The court reasoned that the challenged or-
dinances were "overbroad to the extent that they result in class mem-
bers being arrested for harmless, inoffensive conduct that they are
forced to perform in public places."176 In contrast to the Miami ordi-
nances in question, however, the "anti-homeless" aspects of the
Philadelphia Sidewalk Ordinance do not apply citywide. Thus, home-
less persons have a place to perform the inoffensive conduct in pub-
lic-theyjust do not have that right in all places. Regardless, this as-
pect of the Pottinger analysis seems to apply to the Sidewalk Behavior
167 Id. at 1446.
163 PHILA., PA., CODE§ 10-611(7).
169 Id at (7) (a) (.2).
170 Id.
171 Cf City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1998) (holding that he Chicago gang loiter-
ini ordinance was unconstitutionally vague).
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972) (upholding an anti-noise ordi-
nance).1-13 Id.
174 Id at 114-15.
1-1 Potinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1577.
176 Id.
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Ordinance as well. In Grayned, the Court clearly stated that if Four-
teenth Amendment liberties are impeded, then the law is over-
broad.7 7 Thus, much like the fundamental rights specific to an equal
protection analysis, 78 it seems that a law may violate the prohibition
against an overbroad scope if it interferes with a separate constitu-
tional right.
179
Unfortunately, this analysis may be based on a relic of the law.
The Supreme Court has stated that outside of the First Amendment
context, a law may not be challenged as overbroad.' If this correctly
represents the present state of the law, then, obviously, a court may
not strike down the Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance as overbroad under
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Pottinger court came to an incor-
rect conclusion.181
B. Equal Protection
To violate the equal protection rights of an individual or a class of
persons a law must treat similarly situated persons differently8' and
not survive the level of constitutional scrutiny the Supreme Court re-
quires.'m The higher the scrutiny level, the more likely a court will
strike down the law. In order to invoke strict scrutiny, the highest
scrutiny level,' a law must target a suspect class of persons, or in-
fringe upon a fundamental right of a class of persons. Since a law
must be narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling state interest in or-
der to survive strict scrutiny, plaintiffs obviously want the court toapply strict scrutiny in order to increase the government's burden.'87
1 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114-15.
178 See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
17 See discussion infra Part V.C.
180 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
181 See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
1 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) ("The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." (citation omitted)).
183 See id. (holding that a zoning ordinance prohibiting group homes for the mentally re-
tarded was unconstitutional because it was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest).
184 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down law favoring
contractors who use African-American controlled subcontractors because the law failed strict
scrutiny).
18, See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("We have attempted to reconcile the prin-
ciple with the reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end.")
189See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting that laws classifying by race, alienage, or national origin
must be "suitably tailored" to meet the needs of a compelling government interest).
187 The only case in which the Supreme Court has upheld a law subject to strict scrutiny is
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), a case much criticized. In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld the internment of United States citizens ofJapanese ancestry even after the Court
[Vol. 3:1
PHILADELPHIA ANTI-HOMELFSS ORDIANCE
If a court determines that a law does not target a suspect class, then
the government needs to show only that the law is rationally related
to the state's interest- ' 8 In challenging the Sidewalk Behavior Ordi-
nance, it is important to invoke a heightened level of scrutiny because
the ordinance likely satisfies rational basis review.'6 Since controlling
"behavior" on the sidewalk is rationally related to the avowed purpose
of the city in passing the ordinance-i.e., promoting commerce in
the downtown area-the plaintiffs must invoke strict scrutiny in order
for a court to strike down the law.'9
1. Suspect Class
In order for the Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance to invoke strict
scrutiny under equal protection analysis based upon the allegation
that it targets a suspect class, 9 ' it must meet two requirements: first,
the legislative body must have exhibited an intent to discriminate
against that class; 92 and second, that class must be a "discrete and in-
sular minority""'3 (i.e., a suspect class).
determined that the law deserved strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Congress
has acknowledged the injustice of the internment by providing restitution for individuals forced
to leave their home forJapanese interment camps. Act of Aug. 10, 1988, Pub. L No. 100-383.
102 Stat. 903 (implementing recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians).
Iss See Cebune, 473 U.S. at 440 ("The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid
and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest."). This scrutiny is known as rational basis review.
8 Cf Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1180 n.17 (Cal. 1995) (Mosk.J., dissenting)
("Ve need not hold, therefore, that homeless persons are members of a 'suspect class' in order
to invalidate the [camping] ordinance on equal protection grounds .... [T]he purpose of the
ordinance-to banish a disfavored group-is plainly not a legitimate state interest.).1 Thus, it is not alleged that the ordinance violates the requirement of equal protection
under the law because of a "bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group: United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); rather, it violates the law because it
does not survive strict scrutiny.
19 The courts that have addressed this issue have answered this inquiry in the negative with
little more than summary statement and no support other than that the Supreme Court has
said so. See D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 879 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
lower court dismissed the equal protection claim for failing to state a claim because the plain-
tiffs were not a suspect class and the defendant's actions were related to a permissible govern-
ment objection); Kreimer v. Bureau Police for Towvn of Morristown 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 n.36
(3d Cir. 1992) (noting that the defendants only need to meet the lowest standard of scrutiny
because homeless persons are not a suspect class); Davison v. City of Tuscon, 924 F. Supp. 989,
993 (D. Ariz. 1996) (articulating that rational basis review is appropriate because homeless per-
sons are not a suspect class);Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 355 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
(maintaining that homeless persons should not be treated as a suspect class). rm'd on ogar
grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); National Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. Brown.
Civ. A. No. 92-2257-LFO, 1994 WL 521334, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1994) (holding that homeless
persons are not a suspect class).
1 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (discussing the constitutional standard
for adjudicating claims of radal discrimination).
United States v. Carolene Products Co.. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Justice Stone's
footnote has been called "the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law.' Leuis Powell,
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Not surprisingly, the City Council of Philadelphia did not state
that the Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance was aimed at homeless per-
sons. In fact, as already mentioned, City Council President Street
publicly stated that the ordinance focused on certain types of "behav-
ior" and not any class of persons.'9 ' Nonetheless, the ordinance itself
shows that the City Council intended the law to displace the homeless
within the specified zones. For one, the ordinance forbids activities
normally thought to be the modus operandi of homeless persons: ly-
ing on the sidewalk,'9 5 maintaining one's belongings on the side-
walk, 96 insistent panhandling,97 and begging.'98 Secondly, the ordi-
nance provides for social services and medical assistance for those
violating the ordinance and those whom an officer deems in need of
such services.' This provision explicitly links the consequences of
the legislation to a specified class, i.e., the homeless. That is, it rec-
ognizes that the law will affect persons in need of such social serv-
ices-which, in accord with common sense, likely will be homeless
persons.
This analysis is not affected by the fact that the ordinance is aimed
at the actions of a number of groups in addition to the homeless per-
sons. In order to satisfy the invidious intent requirement, as enunci-
ated in Washington v. Davis,2y ° the discriminatory intent need not con-
stitute the sole factor for passing the law; rather, it need only be a
"motivating factor."20 ' The ordinance itself, as well as the fact that,
along with passing the ordinance, the City Council provided for extra
funds for social services dealing with the homeless, shows that displac-
ing the homeless within the specified districts-that is, dealing with
the homeless-in order to improve the business of the city, was a"motivating factor., 20 2 Thus, the first part of the equal protection
Carolene Products Revisite, 82 COLUNI. L. REv. 1087, 1087 (1982).
194 See supra Part II. It is clear that the ordinance was directed at various groups of people
who use the sidewalk-movers, people who use rollerskates and skateboards, as well as homeless
persons. This conclusion, however, does not immunize the ordinance.
,95 PHILA., PA., CODE§ 10-611(2) (g) (1998).
196 Id. at (2) (1) & (m).
197 Id. at (4) (a).
198 Id.
19 Id. at (7).
2W 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
201 See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (holding
that the fact that the legislature had a second, non-discriminatory motive does not immunize a
statute from strict scrutiny).
M This inclusion of social services is merely the most obvious acknowledgment of the ordi-
nance's likely affect on the homeless population. Without the inclusion of the provision deal-
ing with social services, the ordinance still would be directed at the homeless in part. This mno-
tivation was observed by the three councilpersons who voted against the ordinance,
Councilwoman Jannie Blackwell, Councilman David Cohen, and Councilman Angel Ortiz.
Joann Liviglio, Advocates Fight Philadelphia Sidewalk Law, PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 19, 1999, at 2.
They argued that there were enough laws in Philadelphia to prevent aggressive panhandling
and "camping" on the public sidewalks. Id. In addition, city officials, such as Estelle Richman,
Public Health Commissioner, andJohn Timoney, Police Commissioner, acknowledged that the
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analysis is satisfied.
To receive heightened scrutiny under suspect class analysis, the
class targeted by the invidious law also must, in fact, be a suspect class.
The Supreme Court has not considered whether homeless persons
constitute a suspect class, or a quasi-suspect class, 5 afforded height-
ened constitutional protections. Thus, no Supreme Court precedent
exists denying homeless persons suspect class status.-" Nevertheless,
every court that has addressed that question has ruled that the home-
less do not constitute a suspect class.-° They have done so, however,
without a detailed analysis. 0 They merely assert that the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled that the homeless constitute such a class."
Many of these lower courts have held, summarily, that homeless per-
sons constitute an economic class-a class for which the Court re-
quires only a rational relation to a legitimate government end." '
To say that economics is solely responsible for homelessness belies
the evidence of the many causes and characteristics of homelessness
that show otherwise. One characteristic of the homelessness is, in-
deed, that homeless persons lack the money to buy a home. The
homeless, however, are also disproportionately mentally ill, "- people
of color,10 substance abusers, '21' and people who historically have little
political power. Moreover, the homeless are not distinguished from
other classes based upon their incomes, as the plaintiffs in Haris v.
McCrai'2 were; they are persons who lack a permanent, or semi-
ordinance, in part, was directed toward the homeless, but nonetheless supported the bill. Sar-
lat, supra note 74, at 1A. As Commissioner Timoney said, "This ordinance does not seek to
criminalize homelessness. However there are homeless people that do violate the law. This
ordinance addresses that behavior." Id. Of course, the Commissioner seems to have forgotten
that a law cannot be violated until it is passed.
A "quasi-suspect" class, e.g. gender, is entitled heightened scrutiny, between rational basis
review and strict scrutiny. See geerally GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL, CONsrm.,t.%L Lw 697-
784 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing gender and other possible candidates for heightened scrutiny).
&0' See Rouettp, 850 F. Supp.at 1449 (recognizing that there is no precedent giing homeless
persons suspect class status).
See supra note 189.
2 See, eg., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristownm, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 n.36
(3d. Cir 1992) (dismissing an equal protection assertion and noting that the homeless are not
part of a suspect class).
See, eg., D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 879 n.2 (1Ith Cir. 1995) (stating that the
homeless plaintiffs did not constitute a suspect class); Kimrr, 958 F.2d at 1269 n.36 (stating
without analysis that the homeless do not constitute a suspect class).
2See e-g., Daison v. City of Tuscon, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996) (obscring that
the Supreme Court has ruled that classifications based on wealth are not suspect and that *the
level of scrutiny to be applied to government action that discriminates on the basis of home-
lessness is rational review.").
SeeJo C, Phelan & Bruce G. Link, Who are "The Homeless"? Rreonsidenng the Stability and the
Compositian of the Homdess Population, 89 AM.J. PUB. H-ALTH 1334. 1334 (1999) (noting that the
demographic profile of the homeless population includes a high rate of mental illness).
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (involving a congressional statute aimed at proiding financial
assistance for the "categorically needy").
Feb. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTFFUTIONAL LA V
permanent, place of residence."3 Homelessness is a state of being,
not merely an economic class.
Of course, such existential reasoning does not have a place in
constitutional law. This fact, however, does not mean that the home-
less do not constitute a suspect class. On the contrary, this Comment
avers that they do.
The Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to legislation
that disadvantages groups deemed "discrete and insular mi-
norit[ies]" 214-those minorities that have been historically discrimi-
nated against, that have in common immutable or distinguishing
characteristics, or are politically owerless.2 "' The homeless constitute
a "discrete and insular minority" because they are politically power-
less. Therefore, the homeless constitute a suspect class. 227
As the Supreme Court has said, the purpose of determining
whether a group constitutes a discrete and insular minority 2 8 is that
the Equal Protection Clause requires that a court step in where there
exists "a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities."2 9 Homelessness constitutes such a condition for two
reasons. First, the political process caters to those who vote. Home-
less persons, however, have great difficulty in voting. Because the
homeless often lack an education, they may not know how to go
213 Congressional legislation commonly referred to as the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11301-02 (2000), defines a "homeless individual" as:
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is-a supervised publicly or
privately operated shelter designed to provide temporary living accommodations (in-
cluding welfare hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional housing for the mentally ill);
an institution that provides a temporary residence for individuals intended to be institu-
tionalized; or a public or private place not designated for, or ordinarily used as, a regular
sleeping accommodation for human beings.
214 Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
215 See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (concluding that close relatives do not be-
long to a suspect or quasi-suspect class). See also Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (invalidating a federal
statute that discriminated against "hippies" and "hippie" communes: "if the constitutional con-
ception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest."). See generally, STONE ET AL., supra note 23, at 748-50 (3d ed. 1996) (de-
scribing cases where strict scrutiny applies).
216 Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.217 One court has stated that "[allthough one might conclude that the homeless lack political
power though, the existence of lawsuits like [the one before it brought on behalf of Dallas's
homeless population] belie that assertion." Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 356
(N.D. Tex. 1994). Such reasoning is circular, however: to be deemed politically powerless tin-
der Equal Protection analysis, you have to bring suit in court; but, once you bring suit in court,
you are no longer politically powerless.
218 That the homeless are "discrete" and "insular" in the sense of those words seems clear.
"As a matter of language, 'discrete' means separate or distinct and 'insular' means isolated or
detached." Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. RF'v.
1093, 1105 n.72 (1982).
29 Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
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about registering to vote. Even if they do, their transient existence
may make it impossible to ensure that they will be near the place
where they are registered to vote. Also, as Justice Marshall wrote,
"homeless persons are likely to be denied access to the vote since the
lack of a mailing address or other proof of residence within a State
disqualifies an otherwise eligible citizen from registering to vote."'
Second, the political process caters to those who have money. As
Justice Marshall also has said, "[t]hough numerically significant, the
homeless are politically powerless inasmuch as they lack the financial
resources to obtain access to many of the most effective means of per-
suasion."2' Moreover, the Court has held that certain groups have
historically been "relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." , For the reasons already stated, the homeless fit
within this category.
Thus, because the homeless have historically had no political
power and have not influenced the political process through either of
the two means through which citizens can do so, the vote or the dol-
lar, they constitute a discrete and insular minority.
Does the Philadelphia Sidewalk Ordinance survive heightened
scrutiny? It clearly fails strict scrutiny, the requirement that a law be
necessary to achieve a substantial government interest. The law's re-
strictions apply even where businesses will not be affected, such as in
alleys or on the steps of an abandoned building. Thus, the City
Council did not narrowly tailor the law to the interest the ordinance
is alleged to protect (i.e., city commerce). When using a lesser stan-
dard of scrutiny, on the other hand, it is not immediately clear that
the ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause. A typical height-
ened scrutiny standard invoked by the Court requires that the legisla-
tion be "substantially related to a legitimate state interest." Although
the interest in promoting commerce is "legitimate," the ordinance
does not seem substantially related to that end in that it sweeps too
broadly. The ordinance prevents inoffensive, life-sustaining activities,
such as sleeping or asking for money, at all times in all of the speci-
fied instances within the only area of the city where these life-
sustaining activities are feasible. To protect commerce, the ordi-
nance could have been limited to those activities interfering with pe-
destrian traffic and those activities within a specified proximity of a
place of business. As a result, the ordinance will likely fail intermedi-
ate scrutiny as well.
V0 Clarkv. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,304 n.4 (1984) (Marshall.J..
dissenting). In Pennsylvania, a mailing address is a requirement in order to register to vote. 25
P.S. § 961.527 (1999).
22 Communiyfor Crative Non-Violen., 468 U.S. at 304 n.4.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972).
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2. Fundamental Right
On the other hand, the Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance does not
unconstitutionally inhibit a fundamental right in violation of the
guarantee of equal protection under the law.
A right is fundamental under equal protection analysis when it is"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 2 3 Implied
fundamental rights include the right to vote,24 the right to counsel
on a criminal appeal,2  and the right to travel. 6 Of those fundamen-
tal rights recognized by the Supreme Court, only the right to travel at
first glance seems to suffer from the Sidewalk Ordinance's restric-
tions. Upon closer examination, however, the ordinance does not in-
terfere with the right to travel. The right to travel, under the Equal
Protection Clause, thus far adopted by the Supreme Court involves
the right of interstate travel-the right to travel freely from one state
to another without state-implemented impediments and without suf-
fering a penalty for taking advantage of that right to which other
residents of the state are not subject. The Sidewalk Ordinance does
not inhibit this right to interstate travel because it neither penalizes
those who travel from another state to Pennsylvania2 8 nor inhibits a
person from moving between states. Moreover, the ordinance does
not treat similarly situated persons differently-it treats residents and
non-residents alike. Therefore, it does not impinge on a right to
travel in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
C. Substantive Due Process
The above fundamental right analysis within an equal protection
analysis, however, does not dispense with all right to travel argu-
ments. The Sidewalk Ordinance violates the right to travel guaran-
teed by the Substantive Due Process Clause by forcing homeless per-
Id. at 33-34.
24 See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) ("'[A]ny alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.'"
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964))).
See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) ("'[d]enial of counsel on appeal [to an
indigent] would seem to be a discrimination at least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin v.
Illinois. .. .'" (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
226 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) ("The constitutional right to travel
from one State to another.., occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union." (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966))).
See Seth Kreimer, "But Whoever Treasures Freedom... ". The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial
Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 914 (1993) (explaining that the right to interstate travel "un-
derpins our sense of liberty."). See also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (noting that appellees were ex-
ercising a constitutional right when they traveled from jurisdiction to jurisdiction).
228 Id. at 629 (stating that it is impermissible to deter the migration of indigents into a State).
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sons out of the designated areas of the city. In essence, it violates
their personal liberty interest2 in not traveling.
Summarizing its right to travel jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has said, "[i] t protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and
to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor
rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the sec-
ond State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State."2
This statement recognizes that the right to travel derives independ-
ently from three different sources: a substantive liberty interest (pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause), the right to the privileges and
immunities of the citizens in another state, and the aforementioned
equal protection right.
This Comment argues that the substantive due process protection
that guarantees the right to travel extends to the right to intrastate
travel as well as the right not to travel intrastate.
The Supreme Court has not yet considered a challenge to a law
based on a right to intrastate travel.23' Lower courts, however, have
recognized a right to intrastate travel. Most importantly, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, seated in Philadelphia, has stated that
the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause - encom-
passes the right to intrastate travel: "[t]o the extent that the right to
travel is an aspect of personal liberty protected by substantive due
process, for example-and there is a clear line of cases cited in Sha-
piro at least suggesting that it is-the proposition ... is unimpeach-
able." s Recognizing the requirements for declaring a right funda-
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) ('The right to travel is a part of the liberty' of
which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law... ").
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). The Court then stated, Iflor the purposes of this
case, therefore, we need not identify the source of that particular right in the text of the Consti-
tution." Id. at 501.
2sThe Court has denied at least one petition to issue a writ of certiorari in a case involving
intrastate travel. See King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth.. 442 F.2d 646, 648-49 (2d Cir.
1971) (holding that a residency requirement for admission to public housing violated the fun-
damental right to travel), cert. denied 404 U.S 863 (1971).
M Although substantive due process seems to have fallen out of favor with a majority of the
Court, the Court has continued to refer to the "liberty intcrest7 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cf. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 1990) (-The right to travel does not fit com-
fortably within this range of decisions... because '[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.'" (quoting Bowers v. Hard%ick.
178 U.S. 186, 194 (1986))). But see City of Chicago v. Morales. 527 U.S 41. 54 n.20 (1999)
(Stevens, J.,) ("Neither this history nor the scholarly compendia... persuades us that the right
to engage in loitering that is entirely harmless in both purpose and effect is not a part of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.").
= Lutz, 899 F.2d at 261. Moreover, the court stated:
Not all right to travel opinions have eschewed the burden of locating the right to travel
in some appropriate constitutional text. VariousJustices at various times have suggested
no fewer than seven different sources: the Artide IV Privileges and Immunities Clause,
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause, a conception of national
citizenship said to be implicit in "the structural logic of die Constitution itself." the
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mental, the Third Circuit stated, "the right to move freely about one's
neighborhood or town, even by automobile, is indeed 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' and 'deeply rooted in the Nation's his-
tory. -34
Many pronouncements of the Supreme Court seem in accord with
this assertion.2 3 5 For instance, the Court has recognized that the lib-
erty protected by the Due Process Clause includes the freedom to loi-
ter for innocent purposes.236 The Court also has "expressly identified
[the] 'right to remove from one place to another according to incli-
nation' as 'an attribute of personal liberty' protected by the Constitu-
tion. "217 Similarly, the Court has recognized the right to move "to
whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct" and "the right to
go from one place to another." 2 3 These statements show that the
Constitution protects the right to freedom of movement within a
state and not just after a person has traveled between states.239 In that
respect, the Due Process Clause is not like the Commerce Clause.
If there exists a right to intrastate travel under the liberty guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment, then there exists a right not to
engage in intrastate travel under those same guarantees-that is,
there exists a right not to travel, or for lack of a better term, to stay
put. The Sidewalk Ordinance, by forcing a person to move from
where she is, regardless of whether she is actually interrupting foot
traffic, tourism, or business, violates this right.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence contemplates as
much. Accordingly, "an individual's decision to remain in a public
place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of
Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and each of the Due Process Clauses.
Needless to say, these various provisions serve quite different purposes, and quite differ-
ent doctrines have developed around each. Thus, the right to travel could have dramati-
cally different scope and coverage depending on the constitutional provision from which
it is derived, and the Court recently has provided precious little guidance on which of
them presently give rise to a right to travel, and the respective scopes of each.
Id. at 260-61. Compare Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 991 F.2d 1039, 1045 (2d Cir.
1993) (describing the right to travel as derived from national citizenship, and not from the
Fourteenth Amendment), with Cole v. Housing Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970)
(invalidating a two-year residency requirement for applicants to federally aided, low-rent, public
housing based on the right to travel under the Equal Protection Clause). Other courts, how-
ever, have refused to recognize a fundamental right in intrastate travel. E.g., Andre v. Board of
Trustees, 561 F.2d 48, 53 (7th Cir. 1977); Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th
Cir. 1976); Wright v. City ofJackson, Miss., 506 F.2d 900, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1975).Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268.
235 Cf Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993) (noting that a
restriction affecting purely intrastate travel does not violate the right to interstate travel).
2 See Morales, 527 U.S. at 53.
237 Id.
23 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) ("It was the right to go from one place to another,
including the right to cross state borders while en route, that was vindicated in Edwards v. Cali-
fornia which invalidated a state law that impeded the free interstate passage of the indigent."
(citation omitted)).
239 In fact, the Court has explicitly recognized "the constitutional right to freedom of move-
ment." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
[Vol. 3:1
Feb. 2001] PHILADELPHIA ANTI-HOMELESS ORDIN. LYCE
movement inside frontiers that is 'a part of our heritage.'" ' " This lib-
erty encompasses the right to move "to whatsoever place one's own
inclination may direct." If a person can move at her inclination in a
public place, she can be inclined not to move as well.
The idea that a personal right can be exercised both in invoking it
and in not invoking it finds support in the Court's jurisprudence. As
Justice Scalia has said:
We do not accept [the] criticism that this result "squashes" the liberty
that consists of "the freedom not to conform." It seems to us that reflects
the erroneous view that there is only one side to this controversy-that
one disposition can expand a "liberty" of sorts ithout contracting an
equivalent "liberty" on the other side. Such a happy choice is rarely
available .... If Michael has a "freedom not to conform" (whatever that
means), Gerald must equivalently have a "freedom to conform."V2
This liberty interest in choosing to act, or not to act, also can be
seen in the due process cases dealing with decisional autonomy2z
The power to decide brings with it the power to choose not to exer-
cise one's liberty interest.' Similarly, the right to move in public ar-
eas brings with it the right not to move in public areas.217'
VI. SHOULD THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL COMMUNITY
CHALLENGE THE SIDEWALK BEHAVIOR ORDINANCE?
The Philadelphia chapter of the ACLU and local civil rights law-
yers, like the protesters in front of City Hall, "" have not allowed the
Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance to pass into law quietly. Instead of
challenging the ordinance, the ACLU-led civil rights group, on the
240 Morales, 527 U.S. at 54 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116. 126 11958)).
241 Id. (quoting 1 WILuIAM BLACKSTONE, CO.MME.\TAJUES *130).
242 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110. 130 (1989) (citations omitted).
243 See, eg., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Case%. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming
the right to have an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding a mar-
ried couple's right to use contraception); Roe v. Wade 410 US. 113 (1973) (upholding a
woman's right to decide to have an abortion prior to te list trimester): Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a law that prevented children from attending private or
parochial schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a law that prohibited
teaching foreign languages in schools, based on te right to acquire knowledge). In this %ay,
the right not to move may also be seen as a decisional privacy right. B forcing a person to
move on, the state interferes with that person's right to decisional autonomy.
244 Moreover, the idea that if one has the affirmative right to act, one also has te con rse
right not to act is found throughout the Court's First Amendmentjurisprudence. See Roberts v.
U.S.Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a
freedom not to associate."); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539.
559 (1985) ("[There exists] a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly.") (quoting Estate of
Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348 (1968)); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) ("[There exists] a right to refrain from speaking at all.").
245 This right, like all rights avilable under the Due Process Clause, is not absolute, but may
be interfered with only when the state has the requisite justification to do so.
246 See supra Part Im.
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same day that the ordinance took effect, filed a class action suit" in
federal court seeking to enjoin the harassment of homeless persons
by the city police under the auspices of an "obstruction of the high-,,248 •• .,
way" statute. Under the statute, the city had subjected "hundreds"
of homeless persons to arrests for "obstruction."24' According to an
attorney involved in the suit, arrests of homeless persons for obstruc-
tion had grown exponentially between 1995 and 1999.2" Eventually,
the City agreed to a settlement granting damage awards to the named
plaintiffs, agreeing to cease any pretextual obstruction arrests, paying
attorney's fees and costs, and promising to provide additional train-
ing to police in dealing with the needs of the homeless population.
According to the lead-counsel in the litigation, in the wake of the set-
tlement, the ACLU-led team "made clear to the City"25' that they also
had concerns regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance. Most
likely, this "threat" has been one of the principle reasons that, to
date, the city has made no arrests under the ordinance.
Should the Philadelphia public interest legal community chal-
lenge the ordinance in court?
2
,
3
Putting aside the strategy of the ACLU-led team, the factors
weighing against challenging the law are few, but strong. As already
mentioned, the homeless in this country have been under attack for
some time. 4 The Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance is a fairly mild mani-
festation of this resentment. After all, increased funding for social
services benefiting the homeless came with the ordinance and the
ordinance itself directs officers to first address the concerns of those
persons seeming in need of an Outreach Team. 5 Moreover, there
247 Motion for Class Certification, Graham v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. No. 99-0255 (E.D. Pa.,
January 19, 1999).
248 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5507 (1999). This information, as well as most of the information
contained in this paragraph, was obtained from Paul Messing, Esq. Letter from Paul Messing,
attorney and partner, Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing, Epstein, and Rau, to Jason Leckerman, author
(June 10, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter referred to as "Letter from Paul Messing"].
Mr. Messing was lead counsel in the suit against the city seeking to enjoin the "pretextual" ar-
rests against the homeless under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. sec. 5507 (the "obstructing the highway"
statute).
24 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 5507 (1999).
2W Id. See also Motion for Class Certification, Graham v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. No. 99-
0255 (E.D. Pa.,January 19, 1999).
251 See Letter from Paul Messing, supra note 248.
252 See LauraJ. Bruch, Fewer Homeless on Center City Streets, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 11, 2000, at
B1 addressing the effect of the sidewalk-behavior bill).
I acknowledge that second-guessing the strategy of the ACLU-team is a bit presumptuous.
Nevertheless, I see much merit in doing so. For one, as an outsider, I am in a position to obje c-
tively analyze the strategy/decision. Also, civil rights lawyers who often deal with the city may be
more willing to compromise with one cause, for the sake of future causes, because of the realis-
tic need to negotiate with city officials in order achieve many of their goals (this notion of col-
laboration, on the other hand, may in fact best serve the proposed clients). Finally, adding a
new voice to a debate--or perhaps rekindling that debate-is good in itself.
2M See supra Part II.
255 See supra Part IV.
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has yet to be any knowvn citations issued for violating the ordinance.z '
A challenge to the ordinance may result in backlash or a cry for more
stringent enforcement of the Act. In addition, the realities of the
present state of constitutional law in the federal courts may counsel
patience in bringing a suit. With a conservative judiciary, especially
on the Supreme Court, it may be best not to risk establishing prece-
dent in favor of such law. Finally, it may be that a legal community
with limited resources serves its clients better by focusing those lim-
ited resources elsewhere257
On the other hand, there are many considerations that may weigh
in favor of challenging the ordinance. For one, the issuing of cita-
tions is not the most repugnant aspect of the law. After all, the ordi-
nance was not intended as a revenue builder;, instead, it was a tool to
keep the streets free from those considered to be obstacles in achiev-
ing economic good. The law allows law enforcement officers to re-
strict the liberty of homeless persons by preventing them from re-
maining in the area of the city where they are most likely to find
food, receive charity, and be noticed by the community in general.
By forcing homeless persons to sit and lie outside the downtown area,
the city can effectively hide their plight from tourists and other visi-
tors, business persons, and workers alike.
CONCLUSION
Looks like what drives me crazy
Don't have no effect on you-
But I'm gonna keep at it
Till it drives you crazy, too.25R
Instead of focusing on alleviating the plight of the homeless, cities
across the nation have decided to ostracize them. By limiting life-
sustaining activities59 in which the homeless can engage in the busiest
and most wealth-concentrated areas of our cities, cities have shown
their willingness to displace the homeless in an effort to increase
tourism and downtown development. Most of these laws not only ap-
pear morally skewed, but also unconstitutional. Sidemalk ordinances,
such as the Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance, violate the
equal protection rights of homeless persons and unconstitutionally
See Bruch, supra note 252. It is doubtful that this is due to a lack of possible plaintiffs. To
meet standing requirements, a plaintiff in this instance need only to be forced out of the down-
town. Since observers agree that the ordinance has, indeed, reduced the number of homeless
persons on the streets of Center City, see id., it is clear such possible plaintiffi exist.
25 That is, there may be more pressing areas of the law. such as welfare, where change would
offer greater and more immediate benefits to die homeless.
LANGSTON HUGHES, Evil, in SELECTED POEMS OF LucGSTON HUGHES 45 (1987).
These include trying to obtain money through panhandling, sleeping, and resting.
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infringe upon the liberty guaranteed to all persons by the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although homeless advocates in Philadelphia should not be criti-
cized for not challenging the constitutionality of the Sidewalk Behav-
ior Ordinance, by so doing, they may be sending a message that, in
the long run, may result in greater harm to the homeless members of
the city. Choosing not to challenge such ordinances when there are
legal arguments making such challenges plausible, may send a mes-
sage of acquiescence or agreement to the City Council and other
members of the city's population that may in fact encourage more
anti-homeless legislation. In fact, the supposed "success" of the Side-
walk Behavior Ordinance in Philadelphia, may, in fact, encourage
similar ordinances elsewhere.2 °
Laws such as the Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance are repugnant to
the ideal of the Fourteenth Amendment. They seek to restrict the
freedom of a particular class of citizens: the homeless. The Four-
teenth Amendment, however, protects all of us-the homeless as well
as those with a home-from state laws that infringe upon our free-
dom and target us for being a member of a particular class. The
Fourteenth Amendment is the sword of equality and liberty. With
that sword, laws such as the Philadelphia Sidewalk Behavior Ordi-
nance should be struck down.
260 At a minimum, advocates should vigorously ensure that homeless persons in violation of
the ordinance receive the social and medical services guaranteed by the ordinance and closely
watch the manner in which the ordinance is applied. By doing this, even if the legal commu-
nity definitively decides not to bring a facial challenge, as-applied challenges remain viable al-
ternatives. The district court in Roulette stressed that the plaintiffs had brought a facial chal-
lenge to the Seattle ordinances, and acknowledged that an as-applied challenge still remained
viable. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1446. An as-applied challenge to the Sidewalk Behavior Ordi-
nance under the Fourteenth Amendment seemingly could center on arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement of the Act, a continual failure to warn violators before issuing a citation, or consis-
tent failure of law enforcement officers to properly assess when a violator needs the services of
the Outreach Team. As the district court in Roulette v. City of Seattle stated, "[i]f police officers
enforce the otherwise clear directives of the sidewalk ordinance in an arbitrary or discrimina-
tory manner, then plaintiffs would certainly be justified in bringing a suit challenging the appl i-
cation of the ordinance." Id
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